

27 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Current Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Gromyko's Talk with the President

The following information was given me at 5:50 p.m. by [ ]  
[ ] over the phone:

1. Mr. Gromyko stated that what he had to say was not a reply, but that a reply would be forthcoming in a few days. He could say that the UK proposal, which he understood to be agreeable to the United States, could constitute the basis for a solution of the Laotian matter.

[ ] assumed that Mr. Gromyko meant to say "basis for negotiations".

2. Mr. Gromyko then discussed at some length the virtues of staying off the "brink".

3. [ ] the only specific element in the Laotian situation to which Mr. Gromyko referred was the presence of the Chinese Nationalists. When told of evacuation plans and procedures, Mr. Gromyko seemed satisfied and replied "fine".

4. Mr. Gromyko returned to the subject of the dangers in brinkmanship and that was all.

5. [ ] source was a memorandum of conversation, a "short version" of which he had seen. In commenting on the above, [ ] said he thought it fairly clear that Gromyko's visit was pointed at the SEATO Conference with the intention of preventing any rushness which might be started in Bangkok. In the light of this, [ ] believed that the Warsaw Pact Conference which convenes tomorrow would be much less sensational than some speculation has anticipated.

cc:

2. Sids

2. NA 1-SE

1-01C

1- Mil. [ ]

1- CA/SSB